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Although Madoff has since been arrested and convicted in 2008, clawback suits (or
avoidance actions) to redress the injuries of his victims remain.4 There have been numerous
avoidance actions in which a trustee has been appointed by the courts to initiate clawback suits
against the net winners, seeking to recover the fictitious profits they received and to distribute
them in order to restore customers’ net equity claims. However, the Madoff scandal is not the
only one of its kind. The courts continue to address these clawback suits with respect to
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme as well as other suits to redress the harm caused by other, more recent,
and similar Ponzi schemes.
In the case of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, Irving Picard has been appointed as the
trustee responsible for recovering the money from the fraudulent transfers and distributing it
among the victims of the scheme.5 The overwhelming majority of “net winners” involved
specifically in the Madoff avoidance actions are entities or individuals who innocently benefitted
from the scheme, meaning that it is not alleged that they knew or should have known of the
fraudulent scheme.6 These innocent beneficiaries are also known as “good-faith” transferees in
the context of fraudulent transfer litigation. This memorandum will address issues relating to
Ponzi scheme clawback suits against good-faith defendants.
In fraudulent transfer litigation under Section 548 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
(the “Bankruptcy Code”), where a trustee seeks to recover fictitious profits from good-faith
defendants who received them as part of a Ponzi scheme, the defendants will typically try to
offset their profits with claims of giving value in an effort to retain them. For instance, goodfaith defendants have put forth a value defense, arguing that their receipt of the fictitious profits
qualifies as satisfying the debtor’s antecedent debt owed to them, which gave value to the debtor
4

Sepinwall, Righting Others’ Wrongs, 78 BROOK. L. REV. at *12–13.
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in exchange for the fictitious profits. The value defense is codified in Section 548(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and will be discussed further in Part I of this memorandum. Generally
speaking, the satisfaction of a debtor’s present or antecedent debt constitutes value under Section
548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
However, the prevailing view among New York courts is that transferees do not give
value in exchange for any fictitious profits or fraudulent transfers they receive, even if they act in
good faith. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that
good-faith transferees do not give value beyond their principal deposits and the payment of
fictitious profits do not provide value under section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.7 In reaching
its holding, the Court highlighted several issues that courts have faced in avoidance litigation;
more specifically, regarding what constitutes “value” under these circumstances.
This memorandum will analyze the scope of the “value” affirmative defense pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) in avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. § 548. Part I will examine the ways in
which courts determine “value.” Part II will examine whether recipients of fictitious profits give
value beyond their principal investments.
I.

Determining “Value” Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(c)

The term “value” is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as property, or the satisfaction or
securing of a debtor’s present or antecedent debt.8 “Value” does not include “an unperformed
promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor.”9 Additionally, under 11
U.S.C. § 548(c), transferees can assert a value defense in avoidance actions to the extent that the
transferee received the transfer for value in which he or she gave value to the debtor in exchange

7

Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (hereinafter referred to as “SIPC”), Adv. Proc. Nos. 08–
01789(SMB), 10–04311(SMB), 2016 WL 1695296, at *10–11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016).
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for the transfer(s) in question. As stated in In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., “[a]s a
threshold matter, [§548(c)] by its very terms provides that in order to invoke this defense, the
transferee must satisfy three standards: take (1) for value and (2) in good faith, and (3) claim the
applicable right to the interest only to the extent the transferee gave value to the debtor in
exchange.”10 If a court determines that the transferee does not satisfy any one of these three
elements, section 548(c) will not apply.11 If it is determined that the transferee received the
transfer(s) in question for value and in good faith, then the trustee cannot recover the transfer(s);
meaning the transferee may retain the avoidable transfers they received.12 The burden is on the
transferee to plead and prove each element of this defense.13
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has concluded
that the court’s inquiry must be focused on the specific transaction(s) the trustee is attempting to
avoid, as opposed to the overall value of the transaction(s) to the welfare of the debtor’s
business.14 This is a case-by-case analysis conducted by the courts.15 In addition, the debtor
must receive a fair equivalent or an “amount not disproportionately small as compared with the
value of the property or obligation” the debtor has given to the transferee for value to be present
during the exchange.16 When determining if the exchange was parallel, a court must compare
what was given and received by the debtor.17 Therefore, the proper analysis for determining
value must include an examination of the specific transaction between the debtor and the

10

263 B.R. 406, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id.
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11 U.S.C. § 548(c).
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In re Bayou Group, LLC, 362 B.R. 624, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
14
In re Churchill Mortg. Inv. Corp., 256 B.R. 664, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
15
Id.
16
Id. (citing Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 993 (2d Cir. 1981) (reasoning that if the
exchange is equal, then the creditors have no reason to complain because they have not suffered any loss).
17
Id. (citing In re Guerrera, 225 B.R. 32, 36 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)).
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transferee that is in question, and a measurement of what the debtor gave to the transferee and
what the debtor received in return.18
II.

Recipients of Fictitious Profits Do Not Give Value Beyond their Principal Investments

Furthermore, the prevailing view among the New York Bankruptcy and District Courts is
that the value that investors in a Ponzi scheme give to a debtor in exchange for the transfers they
receive is limited to the amount of their principal investments.19 In other words, pursuant to §
548(c), only a transferee’s principal investment constitutes value.20 According to the court in In
re Bayou, the plaintiffs’ assertion that nearly every court has held that payments received by
investors in excess of their principal investments are voidable as fraudulent transfers is correct.21
As the District Court for the Southern District of New York stated in Picard v. Greiff, “in this
context, the transfers must be assessed on the basis of what they really were; and they really were
artificial transfers designed to further the fraud, rather than any true return on investments.”22 In
addition, the majority of courts have rejected the argument that the payment of the fictitious
profits to the transferees provided value under Section 548(c) because it purportedly satisfied an
antecedent debt or obligation.23
However, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Churchill,
determined that the trustee could not recover the debtor’s payments of commissions to the
brokers because the commissions satisfied the antecedent debts that the debtor owed to the
brokers for their services.24 Therefore, the Court found that the brokers gave value to the debtor

18

Id. at 679.
SIPC, Adv. Proc. Nos. 08–01789(SMB), 10–04311(SMB), 2016 WL 1695296, at *10.
20
In re BLMIS, 499 B.R. 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the “Antecedent Debt Decision”).
21
362 B.R. at 636.
22
476 B.R. 715, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (referring to the receipt of avoidable transfers in the Ponzi scheme context).
23
SIPC, Adv. Proc. Nos. 08–01789(SMB), 10–04311(SMB), 2016 WL 1695296, at *11.
24
256 B.R. at 680.
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when receiving the commissions in question.25 In this case, the brokers, who were also known as
the defendants, were employees of the 15 debtors who rendered an array of financial services
while operating “under the umbrella of ‘The Churchill Group’” (hereinafter referred to as
“Churchill”).26 As employees of Churchill, the brokers provided services to the debtors
including, originating mortgages and/or soliciting investors for them.27 The trustee sought to
recover a sum of $5 million of which the brokers received as payment for these services they
provided to the debtors during the years 1991 through 1997, claiming that the payment of these
commissions did not provide value because they merely perpetuated the debtors’ Ponzi
scheme.28 Ultimately, the Court held that the brokers produced the services they were hired to
do, which gave value, placing a contractual obligation on behalf of Churchill to pay the
commissions sought by the trustee.29 The Court further reasoned that the transaction between the
debtors and the brokers was equivalent in value, and that allowing the trustee to recover the
commissions would be in contrast with the equitable principles underlying fraudulent
conveyance law.30
Although the court in In re Churchill found in favor of the defendants, this case is
distinguishable from other fraudulent transfer cases where the defendants argued that the
avoidable transfers received satisfied an antecedent debt or obligation, as illustrated in the case
In re Bayou.31 The Court in In re Bayou notes that In re Churchill remains as a correct statement

25

Id.
Id. at 667–668 (explaining that Gerald P. Hirsch also falls under the umbrella because he principally operated and
controlled these debtors).
27
Id. at 667 (stating that the brokers were, in fact, hired for the purpose of providing these services to the debtors).
28
Id. at 667, 674 (noting that it is assumed that the brokers were unaware of the Ponzi scheme and acted lawfully
when rendering their services).
29
Id. at 680 (determining that the brokers lawfully earned what they were paid).
30
Id. at 681–682 (stating that the power to avoid transfers in which a transferee received more than what he gave to
the debtor is an equitable remedy created to correct the disparity in this transaction by requiring the transferee to pay
back the excess in value he received).
31
362 B.R. at 637.
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of the law regarding constructive fraudulent conveyances; however, its outcome was a result of
the Court’s determination that the payment of the commissions were not, in fact, constructively
fraudulent because the services rendered by the defendants provided equivalent value in
exchange for the commissions.32 In contrast, the payment of the fictitious profits to the
investors, or defendants in In re Bayou, were paid using fictitious account balances
misrepresented by the fraudulent financial statements that were used to foster the debtor’s Ponzi
scheme.33 Thus, the payment of fictitious profits in this case was inherently fraudulent, and a
fair value was not exchanged during the transaction at issue.34 Moreover, the Court upheld the
rule that transfers received in excess of principal amounts invested are voidable as fraudulent
transfers.35
In an effort to conceal their Ponzi scheme, the debtors, also known as the “Bayou Hedge
Funds,” paid their investors fraudulent and inflated amounts of money that exceeded the actual
amount in the investors’ account balances.36 In actuality, the debtors had falsified the financial
statements to cover up the fact that they had experienced a substantial loss of the investors’
principal deposits and had not made any profits.37 The defendants asserted that they provided
value to the debtors when receiving the payments in return of their principal investments because
it satisfied the antecedent debt owed to them.38 In addition, they argued that the fictitious profits
were payments on antecedent debts because they maintained either a contractual interest or a
statutory prejudgment interest on their investments.39 However, the Court determined that the
defendants had no contractual right to interest and that there was no present or antecedent debt
32

Id. (stating that the commissions paid constituted fair compensation for the services rendered).
Id. at 638.
34
Id. at 637–638.
35
Id. at 636.
36
Id. at 629.
37
Id.
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Id. at 634.
39
Id. at 635.
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that existed for prejudgment interest when they received the payments.40 Ultimately, the Court
rejected the defendants’ value defense and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.41
In addition, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the Antecedent
Debt Decision further rejected the defendants’ claims that the transfers in excess of their
principal investments provided value to the debtor, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities,
LLC (“BLMIS”), by satisfying the antecedent debt owed to them because they held state and
federal claims against BLMIS.42 The Court reasoned that transferees who were already repaid
the full amount of their principal deposits do not have a freestanding interest claim, so their
federal and state law claims to interest would not allow them to retain any of the amounts in
excess they received.43 The defendants argued that “value” should not be restricted to the
amount of principal invested because it is too limited.44 However, the Court determined that
transferees cannot use federal and state law claims to increase the amount of which they are
entitled to; and they are only entitled to their principal investments.45 Therefore, recipients of
fictitious profits in excess of their principal deposits do not provide value and cannot claim that
the payment of those fictitious profits provided value under the theory that they satisfied the
antecedent debts they were owed due to claims that they held an interest on those excess profits.
Furthermore, the most recent case to address the scope of the value defense is SIPC v.
BLMIS in which the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that innocent
transferees involved in a Ponzi scheme must return all fictitious profits they received in excess of

40

Id.
Id. at 639.
42
499 B.R. at 422.
43
Id. at 422.
44
Id. at 425.
45
Id. at 425–426 (noting that this supports the underlying policy of the Securities Investor Protection Act to allow
each customer to recover from the customer property and pro rata distributions based on each of their net-equity
claims instead of allowing those who benefitted from the debtor’s wrongdoing to retain amounts they received).
41
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their principal deposits.46 In this case, Irving Picard, as the trustee for the liquidation of BLMIS
under 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3), sought to recover the fictitious profits from several recipients,
including Andrew Cohen, under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code due to the insolvency of
the BLMIS estate since December 11, 2002.47 Andrew Cohen withdrew approximately $4
million from his account at BLMIS between January 18, 1996 and December 11, 2008.48 Of that
withdrawal, approximately $1.1 million was fictitious profit from BLMIS’ operation of its Ponzi
scheme.49 In an effort to retain these fictitious profits, Cohen asserted that he was a good faith
transferee and that he gave “value,” under § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to BLMIS in
exchange for the avoidable transfers.50 Specifically, Cohen asserted that the payment of
fictitious profit gave value, for purposes of the affirmative defense, by satisfying the antecedent
debts that BLMIS owed to Cohen.51 Additionally, Cohen argued that the previous Antecedent
Debt Decision was wrongly decided because the Court had misinterpreted the Securities Investor
Protection Act by limiting value to the amount of principal investment, which in turn, expanded
the Trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code.52 However, the Bankruptcy Court
rejected both this argument and Cohen’s antecedent debt/value defense, following the same
pattern as the previous New York Courts, making this the fifth rejection of this defense.53
Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court reiterated the two rules: (1) transferees do not give value
beyond their principal deposits and (2) it cannot be argued that the payment of fictitious profits

46

Adv. Proc. Nos. 08–01789(SMB), 10–04311(SMB), 2016 WL 1695296, at *14.
Id. at *4.
48
Id. at *2.
49
Id. at *2–3.
50
Id. at *5.
51
Id.
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Id. at *11.
53
Id. at *5, *10–11.
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provided value under Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code because it satisfied an antecedent
debt or obligation.54
Conclusion
In light of the major Ponzi schemes that have occurred in New York, defendants to the
avoidance actions have increasingly asserted the value defense under Section 548(c) in an effort
to retain the fictitious profits they received. As a result, New York courts have faced the issue of
determining what constitutes “value” under these circumstances. Essentially, the prevailing view
of New York courts is to limit the scope of the value defense under section 548(c) in avoidance
actions by concluding that value given by recipients of fictitious profits is limited to the amount
of principal they have invested.55 Additionally, recipients of fictitious profits cannot argue that
the payment of those profits provided value because it satisfied an antecedent debt or
obligation.56 Accordingly, good-faith recipients of fictitious profits from Ponzi schemes may be
required to turnover their profits because they did not give value for any transfers they received
in excess of their principal deposits.

54

Id. at *10–11.
See SIPC, Adv. Proc. Nos. 08–01789(SMB), 10–04311(SMB), 2016 WL 1695296, at *10.
56
See id. at *11.
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